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I:: THE St'PREME COCRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INC., a Utah
Corporation,

·~~-'-.NADA,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
VS.

GEORGE TANNFR and IDA
1A'.\clEP HAMBLIN,

Defendants and
Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 19247

and
STANLEY H. WALKER, Utah
County Treasurer,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a suit by an alleged assignee of a right of
redemption of real estate from a sheriff's sale against the
assignees of the certificate of sale for a judgment determining
t~at

the plaintiff had rightfully redeemed the land.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for an
amended summary judgment seeking a judgment directing the defendants to execute and deliver to the plaintiff a good and proper

certificate of redemption and directing the defendants to
accept as consideration therefor the sum of $84,366.00 t!1ere
tofore paid to the clerk of the district court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants and appellants seek the reversal of
the amended summary judgment and remand of the case for an
evidentiary trial on the merits.

STATEI'ENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and respondent will be referred to in
this brief as the "plaintiff" and the defendants, George Tanner
and Ida Tanner Hamblin, will be referred to as the "defendants".
This suit involves a parcel of land in Utah County
which was sold on May 26, 1981, at sheriff's sale pursuant to a
decree of the district court entered in the case of First Securit·
Mortgage Company v. American Tierra Corporation, et al,
On June 4,

(R. 3, 4)

1981, the First Security Mortgage Company, the pur-

chaser of the land at the sheriff's sale, assigned to the defend(R. 8, 9).

ants the certificate of sale.

On September 11,

1981,

one Charles Moore, d/b/a/ Township Square, grantor, by warranty
deed, conveyed the above mentioned land and other land to

Grana~

Inc., grantee, subject to taxes and certain trust deeds, specifically described.

(R. 10, 11).
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There is attached to the complaint a document entitled
'~signment

of Right of Redemption", which is undated, but

1cknowledged on November 24, 1981, assigning and transferring
the right of redemption from Charles Moore, d/b/a Township
Square and American Tierra Corporation.

(R. 12 - 14).

It is alleged in the complaint that the transfers
and assignments mentioned above had been made.

It is then

alleged:
"6.
Iimnediately preceding the sheriff's
sale and at all times material hereto, either
Charles Moore, d/b/a Township Square or American Tierra Corporation ("American Tierra") was
the owner of the Subject Property.
Immediately
following the sale either Charles Moore d/b/a
To~~ship Square or American Tierra was the owner
of the right of redemption existing in connection with the Subject Property."
(R. 4)
It is further alleged that on or about November 17,
1981, an agent of the plaintiff contacted an attorney whom was
known to have represented the defendants and that the attorney
said he would contact the defendants to find out what amount
would be required to redeem.

The attorney refused to inform

the plaintiff as to the amount, but indicated the defendants
" .... intended to get the property back."

(R. 5)

It is further alleged that on or about November 23,
1981, plaintiff, through its attorney, contacted Lieutenant
Yeith Bills of the Utah County Sheriff's Department and informed
him that the plaintiff as successor to American Tierra was ready
to redeem, that Tanner and Hamblin were disputing the right of
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the plaintiff to redeem, and that they would not inform the
plaintiff of the amount required to redeem.

It is

t~1en

alle,.L

that Bills instructed plaintiff to pay the amount bid together
with six percent to the Utah County Clerk and that this payment
was made.

(R.

5 , 6) .

A second cause of action alleges that " .... economic
injury" has and is being suffered by plaintiff as a result of
the actions of Tanner and Hamblin .... "

(R. 6)

The defendants answered the complaint, denying the
allegations as to certain contacts with the defendants' alleged
attorney, and denied for lack of information the allegations
regarding contacts with Lieutenant Bills of the Sheriff's office.
(R. 20, 21).

The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an order directing the defendants to execute and
deliver to the plaintiff a certificate of redemption and to
accept from the Utah County Treasurer the funds which had been
paid to the County Clerk.

It is stated in the motion that the

pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact.

(R. 22, 23).

A memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment
was filed to which was attached copies of the documents of
transfer, a copy of the judgment of foreclosure (R. 31 - 34), ar.
affidavit of Lieutenant Keith Bills (R. 39, 40), and affidavits
of David K. Broadbent.

(R. 44, 45, 46 - 48).
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The defendants responded to the motion alleging that
; ayment was tendered as required by Rule 69 (f)

(2), Utah

,rs of Civil Procedure, that payment to the County Clerk is
etrinitted only if there is a disagreement as to whether any
sum demanded for redemption is reasonable and proper, and that
the~e

was no disagreement, and that material issues of fact are

raised by the affidavits of Lieutenant Bills, Mr. Tanner and
~rs.

Hamblin.

(R. 53 - 58)

The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and
made and entered a formal partial summary judgment which orders,
adjudges, and decrees:
(1)

that the plaintiff has taken all steps to redeem

the property described in the complaint;
(2)

that the defendants forthwith execute and deliver

to the plaintiff a certificate of redemption;
(3)

that the county clerk turn over the funds on

de?osit to the defendants;
(4)

that if the defendants should fail, neglect, or

refuse to deliver the certificate of redemption " .... that this
judgment shall stand and be a good sufficient, and complete conveyance and certificate of redemption from the defendants Tanner
and Hamblin to the plaintiff .... ";
(5)
'~fendants

that the title of the plaintiff against the

is quieted;
(6)

that matters raised by the pleadings and not here

adjudicated are reserved for further proceedings.
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An appeal was taken from the partial summary judgment
(Supreme Court No. 18906)

It was dismissed on the ground that

the order appealed from was not a final judgment, citing Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
After the case was remanded, the parties stipulated
that an order might be made by the district court dismissing the
second cause of action for damages.

An amended summary judgment

was made and entered in the same form as the partial summary judgment, referred to above, except that it states that the second
cause of action (damages) is dismissed without prejudice.

There

is, therefore, no issue in the case as to the finality of the
judgment.

(R. 61 - 65)
This appeal is from the amended summary judgment.

(R.

68, 69).

POINT I.
THERE ARE GENVINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVITS
The allegations of the complaint and answer are stated
above under "Statement of Facts".

It will be noted that in para-

graph 6 of the complaint, quoted above on page 3, it is alleged
that " .... either Charles Moore d/b/a Township Square or American
Tierra Corporation ("American Tierra") was the owner of the subject property .... " innnediately preceding the sheriff's sale and
" .... at all times material hereto."
-6-

It is further alleged in the

paragraph that either one or the other was the owner of

,,~,cc
1

right of redemption.

(R.

4)

The allegations of paragraph 6 are denied by paragraph 2 of the defendants' answer.

This raises a genuine issue

of fact as to the ownership of the land and the right of redemption.

(R. 20)
The other genuine issues of material fact relate to

the attempted redemption of the land by the plaintiff.
Rule 69(f)

(2), which relates to the method of redemp-

tion, provides:
"Redemption--How Made.
At the time of
redemption the person seeking the same may make
payment of the amount required to the person
from whom the property is being redeemed, or
for him to the officer who made the sale, or his
successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice
to the officer:
(1) a certified copy of the docket
of the judgment under which he claims the right to
redeem, or, if he redeems upon a mortgage or other
lien, a memorandum of the record thereof certified
by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly
acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary
to establish his claim; (3) an affidavit by himself
or his agent showing the amount then actually due
on the lien."
As stated in the affidavits of Ida T. Hamblin and
George Tanner, no payment of the amount required for the redemption of the land, namely $84,366.00, was made to them or to
either of them, on or before the expiration date of the redempLion period or at all, and no money in any amount was tendered.
(R. 55 - 58).

In fact there was no direct communication, written
-7-

or oral, between a Granada representative and either George
Tanner or Ida Hamblin before the expiration of the redemption
period.

No payment or tender was made to the officer who made
the sale or his successor as required by the rule quoted above.

The affidavit of Lieutenant Keith Bills, attached to the Motion
for Surnrnary Judgment, states that he had a telephone conversation with David K. Broadbent, attorney for Granada, in which

Mr. Broadbent indicated that Granada, Inc., was ready to redeem
the property sold by affiant at sheriff's sale, and that Mr.
Broadbent had asked the Attorney for George Tanner and Ida T.
Hamblin which amount would be required for redemption of the
property.
It is stated:

"Mr. Broadbent also informed Affiant that
Tanner and Hamblin refused to give an amount
and in fact disputed the right of Granada, Inc.,
to redeem the property."
It is further stated in the Affidavit:
"Affiant responded that he had heard that
Tanner and Hamblin were trying to obtain interest
in addition to the amount provided in Rule 69(f),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that in any
event since the amount was not agreed upon he
would be unable to accept the funds tendered.
Affiant informed Mr. Broadbent that he should
deposit the amount of eighty-four-thousand-threehundred-sixty-six dollars ($84, 165. QI)) (the amount
paid by the purchaser at sale plus 6%) with the
Utah County Clerk, since that is the procedure
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when
there is a dispute regarding redemption."
(R. 39,
40).
-8-

The Affidavits of George Tanner and Ida T. Hamblin
j[~

!,c

specifically that at no time before the expiration of

period of red empt ion did Mr. Broadbent contact them person-

ally or by telephone regarding the amount of money required for
redemption and that they had never refused to "give an amount".
The affidavits also state that they had never told Lieutenant

Bills or anyone else in the sheriff's office that they disputed
the amount required for redemption or that they disputed the
right of Granada, Inc., to redeem.

(R. 55 - 58)

The second paragraph of Rule 69 (£)

(3) provides:

"In the event there is a disagreement as to
whether any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may
pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the
amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and
at the same time file with the court a petition
setting forth the item or items demanded to which
he objects, together with his grounds of objection;
and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing
a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of
the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall
be served on the purchaser not less than two days
before the day of hearing.
Upon the hearing of the
objections the court shall enter an order determining
the amount required for redemption.
In the event
an additional amount to that theretofore paid to the
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days.
The purchaser shall forthwith execute
and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon
being paid the amount required by the court for redemption."
As indicated in Rule 69 (£)

(3)

(second paragraph), the

only right of a redemptioner to pay money to the court i s ' ' .....
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded

for redemption is reasonable or proper .... " (Emphasis added.)
-9-

A reading of the affidavit of Lieutenant Bills and
the entire record does not disclose any disagreement as to
whether the sum demanded was reasonable and proper.
davit only

sa~s

That affi-

that Mr. Broadbent said that Tanner and Hamblin

(1) refused to give an amount and (2) disputed the right of
Granada to redeem.

(R.

39, 40)

There is clearly an issue of fact as to whether there
was any disagreement as to the amount required for redemption.
This is obviously a material issue because the rule requires a
disagreement before money can be paid to the court.
A right of redemption from a judicial sale is a statutory right, the nature of which was considered by the Supreme
Court of Utah in the case of Mollerup vs Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122.

It is stated:

"The right of redemption is not an equitable
right created or regulated by principles of equity
but rather is a creature of statute and depends
entirely on the provisions of the statute creating
the right.
U.C.A. 1953, 78-37-6."
In footnote No. 3 on page 1124, the Court cites the
following:

"SO C.J.S. Judicial Sales Sec. 37c; Colvin v.
Weigold, 31 Ariz. 370, 253 P. 633; State ex rel.
Anderson v. Kerr, 51 Minn. 417, 53 N.W. 719; State
v. O'Connor, 6 N.D. 285, 69 N.W. 692."
A case closely in point, which involved a tender of
the redemption money to the clerk of the court as in this case
was decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, Moise v. Ti!Illil,
262 P. 535.

It is stated in the opinion:
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"It seems clear that under this statute the
redemption payment is to be made to the purchaser
or his assign, and that, unless we are to enlarge
the right by construction, a tender made to the
clerk of the court is ineffectual.
"'As a general rule we agree that a statutory
right of redemption is to be favorably regarded,
but, it is statutory right that is not to be enlarged by judicial interpretation. We cannot extend the time allowed for redemption nor waive any
condition attached to the statute.'" Mining Co. v.
Mining Co., 18 N.M. 153, 135 P. 78.
"So it seems that the trial court erred in
basing judgrnent upon payment or tender to the
clerk."
In surmnary, the affidavits in support of the motion
for partial summary judgment, and the affidavits of Mr. Tanner
and

~rs.

Hamblin in opposition thereto, definitely show that no

tender or payment of any money was made to either the" .... person
from whom the property is being redeemed or for him to the officer
who made the sale .... " as required by Rule 69(£)

(2).

The affi-

davits in opposition show conclusively that there was no contact
with the assignees of the certificate of sale by any representative of Granada and there is nothing in the record to show any
disagreement as to the amount required for redemption.
The law in this State is clear that" .... the right of
redemption must be exercised in strict accord with statutory
terms .... ".

It was not so exercised and the motion for amended

summary judgment should have been denied.
S~stems

International, supra.
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Mollerup v. Storage

There is a good reason whv the rule requires a disagreement as to the sum demanded before permittinf' the pa:cien'.
of the redemption money to the clerk.
The defendants were not parties to the case in which
the judgment was entered and the sheriff's sale was held.
were not already in court.

They

The payment of money to the clerk

resulted in plunging them into litigation which obviously would
not have been necessary if Granada had paid the amount of money,
$84,366.00, to them.

This sum could have

been computed by

simple arithmetic in accordance with Rule 69 (f) (3), of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

If, after a tender, there was

a dispute, the money could have been paid to the clerk.
If this amended surrnnary judgment is affirmed, the

provisions of Rule 69 (f) (2) as to payment and tender can, in alJ
cases, be ignored and payment made to the clerk.

POINT II.
THE AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56
OF THE RL'LES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent part:
" .... the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if anv, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any~material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of la\.:."
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The issi_;es raised b:,' the affidavits of Lieutenant
Bills

ar.~

the defendants are discussed under the previous

cJJing and will not be repeated here,

However, the defendants

:ontend that the Lieutenant Keith Bills' affidavit does not
meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) which provides:
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is co~peten~ to testify to the matters stated
therein, ...
It will be noted that Bills' affidavit, quoted, in
?art, on page 8 of this brief is not made on personal knowledge,
:>ut is hearsay, and no pertinent part of it would be admissible
in evidence.
he had heard.

He gave legal advice to Broadbent based on what
(R. 39, 40).

The other affidavit in support of the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment, which was made by David K.
Broadbent, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, states that
affiant contacted Bills and told him that plaintiff was prepared
to redeem the property by paying the sum of $84,366.00, and that
Bills told him that such tender and payment would not be accepted
!:>ecause of an apparent dispute as to the amount.

(R. 44, 45)

The pertinent part of this affidavit is hearsay and
~ 0 ~~d

not be admissible.

Broadbent's affidavit does not show

c1,ntact with either defendant for the purpose either of inquiring
as to the amount due or paying or tendering payment.

-13-

(R. 44, 45).

The following cases hold that an affidavit consisti•
of hearsay statements is insufficient:
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Corporation, 29 Utah 2d

274, 508 P.2d 538.

Western States Thrift and Loan Co. v. Blomquist,
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019.
The affidavits of George Tanner and Ida T. Hamblin,
which are uncontradicted, state that neither of them was contacted by any representative of plaintiff about the redemption,
neither had refused to "give" Broadbent the amount required for
redemption, and neither had told him the amount was disputed.
It is further stated that neither had had any conversation with
Lieutenant Bills and did not tell Lieutenant Bills or any other
person that they were trying to get additional interest.

(R.

55 - 58).
An affidavit was made by Lawson 0. Hamblin to the

effect that in the afternoon of November 27, 1981,

(the last

day for redemption), he talked to Lieutenant Bills in person,
at the Sheriff's office, and inquired as to whether any money hac
been paid to redeem the land and was told, "No one has tendered
any money to me nor to this office to redeem that property."

He

said further that an of fer to pay the money would have to be made
by "12 :00 midnight today".

(R. 59, 60)

The requirements of Rule 56(e), quoted above, have not
been met and there is nothing in the record to support the judgment that a redemption was made.
Holbrook Companv v. Adams, (Utah) 542 P. 2d 191.
Hatch v. Su~arhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156,

434 P.2d 75 .
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POI:\'~

III

A PART Oc :HE A'.E~lDEJ Sl~'.1-:ARY JL'DGMENT IS VOID
FOR WAXT OF Jl'RISDICTION AND OTHER PARTS ARE VOID
''=P THE RE..;so:; THAT Jl'RISDICTION WAS NOT PROPERLY INVOKED

The part of the summary judgment which directs the
c~~n~v

clerk to pay the money on deposit to the defendants is

·.·oid for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Clerk.

The

co'.mt·: treasurer was named as a defendant, but the county clerk
;:as not so named.

No process was served on the county clerk.

There is no jurisdiction over the person and the judgment against
the clerk is void.
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co. , 99 Utah 158,

10JP.2d 134.

The defendants' second point under this heading is
that the part of the judgment declaring that the judgment shall
constitute a certificate of redemption and the part of the judgment quieting plaintiff's title against the defendants are void
because the jurisdiction of the court was not properly invoked.
In the case of Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha
.. Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 245 P. 966, 973, it was held:
"It is fundamental that a petition or pleading
of some kind is the juridical means of investing a
court with jurisdiction of subject matter to adjudicate it."
In this court's opinion in the case of Upper Blue Bench
lrr. Dist. v.

Continental Bank and Trust Co., 93 Utah 325, 72 P.

2; 1048, the follov.'ing is quoted from 1 Freeman on Judgments,
Section 388:
-15-

" .... Mere possession of power to act in res1•ect
to a specific subject matter is of nn consrquen~•
unless the power is properl:: invovC>cl."
See also Hampshire v. Woolev, 72 Vtah 106, 269 P.
In this case, the onlv allegation in the complaint
ownership of the land and the right of redemption is in
6, quoted above on page 3.

11~
o~

paragrap~

It will be noted that it is in the

alternative and is that either Moore or American Tierra own the
land and redemption right.

Apparently the plaintiff did not

who the owner was when the pleading was drafted.

kno~

This allegation

did not invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.

There is

no pleading to support a judgment quieting the plaintiff's title

CONCLUSION
The amended sunmiary judgment should be reversed for the
several reasons set out above and the case should be remanded for
an evidentiary trial.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN
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